The Year 1998 Was Not Good for the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic witnessed three elections (general, Senate, and municipal) in 1998 and two different governments. In general, the year was split into two distinct parts: the first half of 1998 was marked by preparations for early elections, whereas the second part of the year was dominated by the so-called opposition agreement between the ruling Social Democrats (CSSD) and their former most serious opponent, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS).
The main task of the government of Josef Tosovsky that took over from the government of Vaclav Klaus on 2 January was to lead the country to early elections after the Klaus-led coalition fell at the end of 1997. Despite its limited mandate, the Tosovsky government worked hard to submit a number of important draft laws to the parliament. It also campaigned heavily to assure that the ratification of the Czech Republic's membership in NATO take place during its tenure, as it did in April 1998. The foreign policy of the Tosovsky government was also quite active, especially in trying to to persuade NATO countries to ratify the Czech Republic's membership. The government was frequently attacked as the product of President Vaclav Havel's predilection for the so-called non-political politics. Consisting of both politicians representing smaller parties and non-partisans, the government was repeatedly attacked by the ODS, in particular. Its leader, Vaclav Klaus, successfully managed to create a myth of a political conspiracy that allegedly had contributed to his downfall. As a result, the real reasons of the country's deepening economic and political crises were never properly analyzed and important lessons were missed. The Union of Freedom (US), founded in the spring by politicians who had left the ODS amid reports of improper financial practices, was never able to explain why it had been created. Its leaders missed the opportunity to talk openly about financial machinations within the ODS. Nor did they analyze the causes of the country's problems, among which the leadership style of Vaclav Klaus and Klaus's unwillingness to finish important reforms were perhaps the most important. The CSSD became the strongest party during the first half of 1998, and only few doubted that it would win the early elections. The elections results confirmed such predictions but were surprising in other ways. Perhaps the most surprising result was the failure of the far-right Republicans to win any seats in the parliament. The Pensioners' party that scored high in pre-election opinion polls also failed to win any seats. Another surprise was a rather good performance of the ODS, that finished close second. The victory of the CSSD came despite the fact the ODS ran a campaign designed to scare Czechs from voting for the left. The party's victory was an important psychological experience for most Czechs, as the Czech Republic had been the only post-communist country where the political pendulum did not shift from the right to the left. However, post-election negotiations showed that the task of the CSSD to form a government will not be easy. Of the five parties that won seats in the parliament, the unreformed Communists could not be approached as a possible coalition partner. The centrist Christian Democrats were willing to join the government on the condition the US had supported or joined the government as well. The US, however, pointing to its rightist orientation, refused to work with the CSSD. The CSSD was in the end able to form a minority government on its own with the help of the ODS. Under the opposition agreement the two parties basically decided to divide the most important state posts between them and work together on changing the Constitution as well as the electoral law. Both agreed that the influence of small parties should be reduced. Although the electoral results did not give too many chances to put together a majority government, the opposition agreement has proved to be counterproductive in many ways. Above all, many Czech voters have come to believe that politics is a highly cynical game, in which the former archenemies can agree to cooperate after the elections with the visible objective of dividing the spoils of power. Although the agreement was supposed to assure stability, it helped to create a weak minority government, unable to go ahead on its own with important reforms. The Senate elections in November confirmed that most Czech were unhappy with politics in general---less than 50% bothered to vote in the municipal elections, while only 25% did so in the second round of the Senate elections. Despite the low voter participation, the Senate elections showed that the public is not happy with the opposition agreement. The coalition of four small right-of-center parties, formed with the purpose of fighting the cooperation between the oDS and the CSSD, won more Senate seats than the two big parties together. The weakness of the government became increasingly apparent after the European Union released a report in which it evaluated the Czech Republic's progress in meeting various EU requirements. The Czech Republic received bad marks in a number of areas. Despite the fact the need to deal with EU requirements and with the country's worsening economic performance call for comprehensive measures, it is clear that the weak government--however good its intentions may be--will not be able to adopt such measures. At the end of 1998, the Czech Republic was a country headed for more problems. Some analysts predict that in 1999 the country will experience a full blown-crisis, similar to those that other post-communist countries experienced a few years ago. The biggest problem is that the country's political elite appears to be unable to find a common language. It is not, therefore, clear, whether a real crisis could have serve as the same kind of catharsis as it did, for example, in Poland and Hungary.
Reuters - 22. 12. 1998
