What are the changes of a stable government after elections?

Opinion polls and recent political developments indicate it may be very difficult to form a stable government after the early elections, scheduled for June. The Social Democratic Party (CSSD) enjoys support of some 28 percent of Czech voters. The strongest right-of-center parties--the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Freedom Union (US), the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL)--are each supported by about 10 percent of voters. The Civic Democratic Alliance, which has been plunged into a deep crisis following revelations about its dubious party financing practices, is now supported by less than 5 percent of voters, which means the party would not make it into the parliament.

The Czech Republic's two most visible extremist parties--the far-right Republicans and the Communists--are between them likely to win at least 20 percent of the popular vote. Since none of the democratic parties is willing to form a coalition with the extremists, it means that neither a coalition of right-of-center parties nor the CSSD on its own can have a majority support in the parliament.

Clearly, the CSSD could form a government with majority support only if it is able to convince one or more right-of-center parties to enter into a coalition with the CSSD. Until recently, it had been taken almost for granted that the KDU-CSL, whose program emphasizes social solidarity, would be willing to form a coalition government with the CSSD. Such a government would most likely enjoy the support of more than 100 deputies in the 200-member lower chamber of the parliament.

The KDU-CSL, however, appears increasingly reluctant to form a coalition with the CSSD, following a series of radical decisions and announcements made by the CSSD. The party decided, for example, to nominate Milos Zeman for the post of prime minister and Vladimir Spidla and Pavel Rychetsky for the posts of deputy prime ministers, although it is likely that it will first have to negotiate with any prospective coalition partner. The outline of the CSSD's economic program, revealed in February, was immediately criticized by KDU-CSL Chairman Josef Lux. He argued, for example, that the CSSD's plan to introduce import tariffs is a bad idea in light of the the Czech Republic's decreasing trade deficit. The CSSD also engaged in a hysterical campaign against Germany's decision to name prominent Sudeten Germans into a coordination committee of the Czech-German discussion forum formed on the basis of the last year's Czech German declaration. The KDU-CSL not only has different opinions on this subject but is also close to Germany's Christian Democrats.

At a recent congress of the US, Lux said that the US, rather than the CSSD, is the KDU-CSL's most natural political ally. Lux is under pressure from some officials in his own party, including deputy chairman Jan Kasal, who are strongly opposed to a coalition with the CSSD on ideological grounds.

While it is possible that some statements by KDU-CSL officials on a possible coalition with the CSSD may be just tactical maneuvering, whose aim is to make the CSSD more open to the KDU-CSL's demands after the elections, it is also possible that the KDU-CSL will stay in the opposition after the elections, together with the other right-of-center parties. Having the CSSD form a minority government would give certain advantages to right-of-center parties. They, including the KDU-CSL, would not be seen as being directly responsible for the CSSD's decisions and could, under certain circumstances, bring the CSSD down in a vote of no-confidence.

Such a situation would, however, leave the country in the same decision-making paralysis it has faced in the last two years. The CSSD would be able to push through only a limited number of decisions. Neither the CSSD nor the right-of-center parties would be able to move ahead with any large scale reforms. Moreover, a minority government formed by the CSSD would, to some extent, depend on the Communists for support. Such a development would make the orthodox Communist Party not only more visible but also more important.

Clearly, forming a stable government after the elections may be a daunting ask, unless the CSSD is able to find a coalition partner, or unless all major parties are willing to form a grand coalition. In both cases, the CSSD would first have to modify some of its radical rhetoric and move to the political center. Such a development could, however, threaten the party's unity. Its radical wing, led by Vadimir Spidla, is likely to fight any ideological moderation.

Should the elections produce a deadlock again, Czech politicians may start thinking hard about changing the electoral system based on proportional representation. This system, under which the voters vote for party tickets in large electoral districts rather than for individual candidates in small districts, makes it possible for extremist parties to take up 20 percent of the lower chamber's seats. It also encourages the existence of small parties, as any party that passes the 5 percent hurdle wins seats in the parliament. A combined system or a majority representation system would narrow the number of parliamentary parties by forcing parties of similar political orientations to merge. It would also eliminate the presence of the extremists in the parliament.

Although arguments can be made as to why it is better to make extremist parties visible, rather than to drive them underground, it is clear that the current system is prone to producing political deadlocks and, in turn, instability. Political culture in the country has not developed to the point where a minority government could be seen as a solution that is not necessarily bad, such as in some Scandinavian countries. In the Czech Republic, where some major transformation projects still need to be completed, a yet another political deadlock could shake the public's trust in the effectiveness of democracy and impede the country's chances of meeting European Union membership criteria any time soon.

Reuters - 3. 3. 1998