What can be expected of Social democratic government?

Opinion polls suggest that the Czech Social Democrats (CSSD) will win the early elections, most likely to be held in June, with a large margin. Preparing for taking over the government, the CSSD has even officially decided that its chairman, Milos Zeman, would be the next prime minister. Although such a decision may strike observers as premature, the CSSD had good reasons to act in such a way.

First, the CSSD has been suspected that, after having always been only an opposition party, it is afraid of governing. Second, political commentators have repeatedly suggested that the CSSD may not have enough high-quality people to be able to form a government. In nominating Zeman, the CSSD is sending a signal that it is ready to govern. Moreover, the party also nominated Vladimir Spidla as the deputy prime minister responsible for social affairs and Pavel Rychetsky as the deputy prime minister responsible for legal affairs.

In doing so, the CSSD has tried to appeal to both radical and moderate voters. Spidla i known as a representative of the left wing radicals in the party, whereas Rychetsky, formerly an official of the liberal Civic Movement, is a moderate centrist. Zeman is seen as someone who holds both wings of the party together.

Given the CSSD's internal ideological disunity, questions about the CSSD's post-election orientation are beginning to emerge. Will the party pursue some of its more radical ideas, such as introducing import tariffs, or will it try to move to the center? The fact the CSSD supported the Tosovsky government suggests that the party is already becoming more moderate. If it indeed wants to win more than 30% of the popular vote, as CSSD leaders suggest, the CSSD will need to win over moderate, centrist voters. There is a large number of such voters, who have abandoned the former coalition parties and find themselves in a political no man's land. In the past, such voters have been discouraged from supporting the CSSD by some of its radical views.

Besides supporting the Tosovsky government, there are other signs that the CSSD may be be moving to the center. Some party leaders have, for example, indicated, that the CSSD may not insist on bringing the retirement age down to 60 years for men. In the past, the party argued in favor of such early retirement age. Now it apparently realizes there may not be enough money in the state coffers to pay for this and other similarly generous policies.

In general the CSSD for many years behaved like typical opposition party. It could make promises that could never be tested. Now, as the possibility that the CSSD will be in the government grows, the CSSD has had to modify some of its objectives. And it is likely that more CSSD views will have to be rectified. First, it is clear that once the CSSD is in the government, it will realize that the playing field on which it has to perform is much smaller than it has thought. In fact, if the party is serious in its pledges to lead the country in the European Union, it will have to follow many of the policies of the previous governments.

Second, the CSSD will most likely not be able to govern alone. Its most likely coalition partner, the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-CSL), is a centrist party. The CSSD will thus have to accommodate some of the KDU-CSL's demands. The presence of the KDU-CSL in the government will also automatically ensure a degree of continuity with the previous governments' policies. Moreover, the KDU-CSL may ask for some of the ministries that the CSSD would like to have for itself.

The need to negotiate with the KDU-CSL will also influence the internal discussion in the CSSD. It will probably strengthen the moderates who will argue that only a more centrist approach can guarantee a coalition with the KDU-CSL. Given the need to win over centrist voters and the prospect of a coalition with the KDU-CSL, it is therefore likely that in the next few months we will see a gradual movement of the CSSD to the political center.

Reuters - 3. 2. 1998