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Kosovo crisis splits Czech political elite

The Czech political elite is deeply divided over the NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia. While the leaderships of the Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL), the Freedom Union (US), and the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) have supported the NATO action, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social Democrats (CSSD) have been ambivalent, at best, about expressing their support.

ODS Chairman Vaclav Klaus has criticized the military intervention as a step that is not likely to solve the Kosovo crisis. He has argued that negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic should have continued or should be resumed. When asked during a recent interview on Czech Television whether he can offer any alternatives to the NATO intervention, Klaus answered he is "no strategist." He also described supporters of the NATO action as "war mongers." The leadership of the ODS has issued a statement which echoed Klaus's views.

Some prominent ODS politicians, such as deputies Jiri Payne and Jan Klas, have took an issue with Klaus's views and criticized the party leadership for issuing a statement that "harms the interests of the Czech Republic." Some local organizations of the ODS, for example in Prague, Hradec Kralove and Brno, have distanced themselves from the views of the ODS leadership. They argue that the Czech Republic, as a new NATO member, should support the NATO action without any ambivalence. In fact, the split over the NATO action in Yugoslavia is the most serious internal crisis within the ODS since a group of prominent politicians left the ODS at the beginning of 1998 to found the US.

The CSSD is equally disunited over the Kosovo crisis. Foreign Affairs Minister Jan Kavan has stood firmly behind the NATO action. When Karel Kovanda, the Czech Ambassador to NATO, recently told Czech Radio that the reluctance of the Czech government to rally behind NATO has provoked critical reactions in Brussels, Kavan, under pressure from the government, reprimanded Kovanda for making such public statements before consulting them with the government. But, clearly, the foreign minister did so reluctantly.

He has been the only unambiguous advocate of the NATO military action within the Czech government. Other ministers have been reluctant to support NATO without reservations. Prime Minister Milos Zeman has even called supporters of the NATO intervention "troglodytes." Although the Czech government has officially sanctioned various phases of the NATO military operation in Yugoslavia, some ministers voted against and others refrained from voting. Transportation Minister Antonin Peltram told a Czech newspaper that he and other ministers "do not like bombing". In what sounded at first almost as a joke, Peltram also said that "ethnic cleansing" during this time of the year was unsavory.

All of such reactions to the Kosovo crisis suggest that Czech politicians often lack proper information to come up with qualified opinions. Klaus and Zeman have both argued that agreeing with NATO is not mandatory. Zeman has frequently contrasted the Warsaw Pact with NATO, noting that during the communist regime one had no choice but to agree with the actions of the Warsaw Pact. In fact, some people, such as President and former dissident Vaclav Havel, had the courage to disagree with both the communist regime and the Warsaw Pact. Paradoxically, today, those former dissidents question the NATO action much less than former conformists.

It is clear that a military operation such as that waged by NATO against Yugoslavia is bound to provoke different views. Discussing various options and possibilities for settling the conflict is legitimate. However, some leading Czech politicians have put their right to express their own views on the NATO action above the Czech Republic's loyalty to an organization that admitted the Czech Republic only a few weeks ago.

The fact that Klaus or Zeman differ from Havel over the NATO action is not as troubling as the fact that they act as if the Czech Republic both was and was not a member of NATO. Political commentators have sensed a degree of traditional Czech opportunism in the comments of various CSSD and ODS politicians. And they have seen such opportunism and a lack of publicly expressed clear stances as being more troubling than politicians' unqualified arguments about how the crisis in Kosovo could be best solved

The upcoming CSSD congress is certain to witness heated arguments about the Kosovo crisis. Strong supporters of the NATO military action will most likely be on the defensive. On the other hand, CSSD politicians know that they cannot go too far in pushing the CSSD government to distance itself from the NATO operation. Much as some of them do not like NATO, they realize that any open resistance by the Czech government to the NATO military action could backfire, triggering domestic political turmoil that could sweep the government from power.

Reuters - 7. 4. 1999