The Political and Economic situation in the Czech republic in the Year 2000

(written for the BBG)

Ten years after the fall of the communist system, the Czech Republic, just like most other post-communist countries, suffers from the problem of “a democratic deficit.” On the one hand, the country has been able to introduce all of the democratic institutions and mechanisms that are the trademarks of modern democratic systems (free elections, checks and balances, etc.); on the other hand, only now is it becoming apparent that the notion of democracy is much broader than the notion of democratic system.

A Brief Historical Overview

While it was fairly easy to introduce various democratic institutions (as the post communist political elite could choose from a wide menu of the systems existing in the West and could rely on the democratic traditions of the democratic Czechoslovakia before World War II), qualities such tolerance, a culture of democratic dialogue, respect for minorities, or respect for the law, appear to be much more difficult to acquire. The communist system devastated several generations of Czechs.

Moreover, unlike Poland and Hungary, in the last twenty years before the fall of communism Czechoslovakia lived under a very harsh neo-Stalinist regime, that was installed after the military invasion of the Warsaw Pact armies in 1968. While in both Poland and Hungary the communist parties allowed a degree of liberalization in the 1970s and the 1980s, in Czechoslovakia all expressions of dissent were severely punished. Relatively large areas of semi-official activities existed in Poland and Hungary, whereas in Czechoslovakia the dissident ghetto was small and under constant pressure from the police.

When the communist system collapsed in Poland and Hungary, reformers within those two countries’ communist parties had enough legitimacy to be able transform those parties into social democratic groupings. The Czechoslovak Communist Party lacked both: reformers and legitimacy. As a result, social democratic parties had to be built from below by political amateurs or former communists, who were expelled from the communist party after 1968.

Since the collapse of the communist system, Czechoslovakia has lacked much more than Poland and Hungary a class of political professionals. Not only were there no democratic left political figures within the Czechoslovak Communist Party but there were also very few activists outside the communist party who had acquired enough skills to be able to function as professional democratic politicians. In other words, while in Hungary and Poland, new political classes of future democratic politicians acquired political skills in the relatively large areas of the budding civil society, independent activities in Czechoslovakia were limited only to a handful of dissidents.

The so-called normalization regime, installed after the military invasion in 1968, instilled in average people conformist attitudes and a lack of respect for both the state and the law. The culture of a democratic dialogue virtually vanished. Since the fall of communism, one can observe an interesting mix of realities in the Czech lands: on the one hand, the reality of democratic mechanisms, including a market economy; on the other hand, behavioral patterns among both average citizens and politicians that still hark back to the days of the normalization regime.

The fact a robust social democratic party did not come to existence for several years after the fall of communist, strengthened the political right. Political-right parties, such as Vaclav Klaus’s Civic Democratic party (ODS) pursued the ideology of economic liberalism but in reality were hampered by the old socialist habits. While in Poland and Hungary, the post-communist political right parties were confronted with strong democratic left parties, in Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech Republic), the democratic left parties were long unable to offer any real “mirror” to the policies of the ODS and its allies. This had rather devastating effects on the quality of Czech political culture. The old “communist” ways of thinking, based on slogans such as “Who is not with us is against us” quickly made their way back into the political mainstream.

A lack of democratic discussion about major reforms can be blamed for the fact that some transformation policies were flawed. It appears that the most significant failure was the unwillingness of the Klaus governments to accompany economic reforms by putting in place an effective legal framework. As result, private ownership was created without proper regulatory frameworks that are common in the West. The Czech capital markets were for a period of time totally non-transparent, driving potential investors away. A number of banks, firms, and investments funds collapsed due to dubious economic schemes that would be criminal in developed Western countries but could not be punished under the imperfect Czech laws.

The Klaus governments believed in the ideology of “the invisible hand of the market”. In other words, they believed that a newly created market economy needed as little regulation as possible because market forces posses strong self-regulatory mechanisms. As a result, the kind of market economy that was created in the Czech Republic could be compared to a game whose rules are not known to anyone and where there is no referee.

Just as old habits were not effectively rooted out of the economy, they were not eliminated in the political process either. The Klaus-led coalition was defeated in the elections in 1996, but the minority right-of-center government led by Klaus drew almost no lessons from the growing dissatisfaction of many people over the course of the reform process. In 1997, the minority government collapsed amidst party financing scandals in the ODS.

The early elections in June 1998 produced a political stalemate again. Although the Social Democrats (CSSD) won, they were unable to form a majority coalition. In July, the CSSD and the ODS signed the so-called opposition agreement, under which the CSSD was able to form a minority government in exchange for giving the ODS top posts in the parliament.

The Current Situation

The opposition agreement has been repeatedly criticized by the President Vaclav Havel and the opposition party as potentially undemocratic. It is basically a power-sharing arrangement, under which the two larger parties have divided power in the state between them. They also agreed to amend the Constitution and the electoral law in a way that suits their own interests.

A package of constitutional amendments was indeed produced by a joint ODS-CSSD committee in 1999. The main goal of the package was to limit the powers of the president and strengthen the influence of party secretariats. Under the amendments the president’s powers to grand pardons and amnesties as well his powers in appointing various high-level officials would be reduced. The president’s in appointing the prime ministers after elections would also be curtailed. The amendments would also reduce the independence of the Central Bank. The parliament’s lower chamber passed the amendments at the beginning of the year 2000 but the parliament’s upper chamber, the Senate, appears to be reluctant to pass the package.

A new electoral law prepared by the two parties was passed by both chambers of the parliament in the spring of the year 2000. The president, whose veto was overridden by the parliament, appealed to the Constitutional Court. Havel argues that the law is unconstitutional because it violates the principles of the proportional electoral system, under which, the Czech Constitution says, the elections to the lower chamber are to be held. In dividing the country into a large number of small electoral districts, the law introduces majority elements into the proportional system. It would significantly strengthen large parties and could result in the creation of a two-party system.

The ODS and the CSSD also seem to cooperate in a number of other areas. They have jointly attacked the independence of the Central Bank, passing, in July 2000, a new law on the Central Bank that would limit the bank’s independence. Although the law has been criticized by the European Union and contains articles that are clearly unconstitutional, the parties worked together to pass it.

At the same time, the ODS and the CSSD have worked together to limit the freedom of some media, such as public TV and Radio. The Board for Czech Television was recalled at the beginning of 2000 and replaced by a board whose members were selected strictly by the parties. The director of Czech TV was forced to resign. High-level politician, particularly from the ODS, are reported to have repeatedly put pressure on the management of Czech TV. Similar pressure has been reported in Czech Radio.

Both the ODS and the CSSD argue that they cooperate for the sake of political and economic stability. They have come close to the model of cooperation between ideologically different parties that was used in Austria for several decades. The fact that in Austria, besides producing stability, this model eventually generated political dissatisfaction reflected in the rise of the far-right Free Democrats of Joerg Haider, seems to be of no concern to the ODS and the CSSD leaders.

Both the ODS and the CSSD have also repeatedly displayed hostility toward independent civic movements. In their opinion, politics are only for political parties. Leaders of various civic initiatives have repeatedly been called “elitists” who want to interfere with the political process without having a democratic mandate.

This argumentation resembles that of the communist leaders more than ten years ago. In fact, there are more similarities. Political parties remain organized strictly hierarchically, drawing in very few new members. Despite the fact they are small, they exercise huge power. President Havel has repeatedly warned against such excessive partisanship that disregards civil society.

The Czech Republic has made some important progress in adjusting its standards and laws to those of the European Union in the last few years. The CSSD government has been much more forceful than the Klaus governments in pursuing a pro-EU line. At the same time, the ODS has grown increasingly anti-EU, emphasizing nationalist policies. Some observers have justly suggested that the ODS has gone through the process of Haiderization.

Although the CSSD remains more pro-EU in its views, its close cooperation with the ODS has also blunted its pro-EU enthusiasm. Combined, the two parties now represent a danger to the Czech Republic’s effort to join the EU soon. It seems that especially when it comes to matters such as fighting corruption and economic crime, both parties are rather reluctant.

In all of this, the media remain rather unprofessional. The most influential media organization in the country, the private television station Nova TV, is firmly tied through various financial interests with the ODS and the CSSD. TV Nova’s director Vladimir Zelezny has been engaged in a bitter legal dispute with American investors, whom he used in the past to finance his station.

Newspapers have avoided party or government control but their journalists are often extremely biased in their reporting. Ten years after the fall of communism, many articles that should just report events are in fact opinion pieces. Investigative journalism is still very fragile. Newspapers have been able to uncover various economic and political scandals but in most cases have been unable to pursue such scandals. As a result, politicians have been able to deflect any criticism. Prime Minister Milos Zeman has even called journalists repeatedly “idiots” and “scum,” without any consequences for his political fortunes.

In the latest development, the CSSD filed criminal charges against two investigative journalists from the Mlada Fronta Dnes daily, after those two journalists published reports on a defamatory materials prepared reportedly in the Prime Minister’s office with the aim of discrediting one of his party opponents. The only “crime” committed by the two reporters seems to be that they refuse to reveal their source of information. In the meantime, some of premier’s subordinates have confirmed that the defamatory material was indeed produced in his office.

Conclusions

The Czech Republic is a country with a democratic system but not a fully developed democracy. Political leaders frequently manipulate the weak media and engage in practices that undercut the democratic process. The country’s most important goal is to institute as quickly as possible the rule of law and a truly democratic political culture. This is, of course, extremely difficult in a society where the legacy of the communist era is still very strong.

The eventual accession of the Czech Republic to the EU could speed up the process of overcoming the undemocratic vestiges of communism. However, it is not clear how quickly the Czech republic can reach that goal, as problems exist on both sides: the Czech Republic’s ability to meet various criteria of EU membership and the EU’s willingness to expand to the East.

The gradual strengthening of civil society is another important remedy. That will not happen, however, without robust, independent media. Domestic media often still do not have enough experience and economic strength to perform the role of the watchdog of democracy and achieving the level of professionalism common in the best Western media may require a generation change.

BBG - 18. 9. 2000