The New Face of Fascism

Extreme-right and post-fascist parties, whose rising popularity caused alarm across Western Europe a few years ago, seem to be fading. However, political radicalism, extreme-right sentiments, and fascism in Europe are far from dead.

Just as both extreme-right and post-fascist groups in Western Europe began to weaken, Europe’s east has seen a revival of extreme-right and fascist sentiments, most ominously with the successes of nationalist radicals in the recent Russian and Serbian elections.

At the same time, the costs of weakening extreme-right, nationalist, and post-fascist parties in Western and Central Europe have been high because mainstream political forces were forced to adopt some of the extreme right’s vocabulary and agenda. Anti-immigration sentiments, greater skepticism toward European integration, or, for example, anti-Semitism masked as criticism of Israel’s policies, have been embraced by many mainstream European politicians and parties.

Extremist parties have also been marginalized owing to their weak position in pan-European politics. Voters in Italy, France, the Netherlands, or Austria — the countries in which post-fascist or extreme-right parties incited the greatest concerns —gradually realized that extremist parties were allowed by mainstream democratic forces in Europe to have only limited influence in European politics, extremist remaining mere rarities of sorts in the European Parliament and other EU institutions. Some — for example, Jörg Haider’s Free Democrats in Austria, or the Italian post-fascists of Gianfranco Fini — were forced to adopt less radical views after becoming members of government coalitions.

While West European extremism has been driven mainly by xenophobia, which was provoked by immigration, EU enlargement, and pressures of globalization, xenophobic radicalism in Europe’s east has different causes. The recent electoral successes of the Serbian Radical Party of Vojislav Seslj or Russian nationalist parties, as well as the strong position of Vadim Tudor’s Greater Romania Party in Romania, have been caused mainly by a combination of rabid nationalism and pressures of modernization.

Those countries, with some delay, follow in the footsteps of some postcommunist nations in Central Europe, where nationalist/populist parties, such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia of Vladimir Meciar, retarded democratization and market reform a decade ago. As in Western Europe, in most postcommunist countries that are to become EU members in May 2004, both political radicalism and nationalism have been politically neutralized at the cost of being to some extent embraced by mainstream political parties.

Milder versions of nationalist, euroskeptical, or xenophobic slogans can now be heard from political parties such as the Czech Republic’s Civic Democrats or Hungary’s Fidesz, the largest opposition forces in those countries. In other words, both the language and the agenda that originally belonged to extreme-right parties have been appropriated by the political mainstream.

Russia, Serbia, and Romania may, however, have a more difficult road ahead. First, unlike the postcommunist countries of Central Europe, they do not have Western political and philosophical traditions. Close ties between the state and their Orthodox churches forged state religions that have helped to create a strong sense of national messianism. In other words, nationalists in Russia, Serbia, or Romania are able to draw on widespread beliefs that their nations have special historical missions.

Second, because the role of the state has traditionally been very strong – while the democratic separation of powers and attempts to introduce the rule of law are relatively new developments — corporatist tendencies that characterized, for example, Italian fascism in the 1930’s remain potent in those countries. Finally, globalization, the pressures arising from market reform, modernization of institutions, and other new phenomena, have disoriented those societies.

A strong sense of a historical mission, combined with social and economic problems caused by reforms and external pressures, as well as a weakening of those countries’ international status, represent an explosive mix that plays into the hands of radicals. So it is possible that the rise of post-fascist tendencies, nationalism, and political extremism may not be temporary, as in Central Europe, or marginal phenomena witnessed recently in Western Europe.

But important differences between Russia, Serbia, and Romania should be noted. The last of the three countries is a candidate for EU membership in 2007. The process of accession has definitely had moderating effects on Romanian politics.

Romania’s 2 million ethnic Hungarians, the main political targets of Romanian nationalists, represent a bridge to the EU, because Hungary will be a member of the EU three years before Romania. Transylvania, where ethnic Hungarians mainly live, is also Romania’s cultural bridge to the West, as this part of today’s Romania belonged for centuries to the Hapsburg Empire. The hope of EU membership gives mainstream Romanian politicians and the Romanian public strong incentives not to succumb to nationalist sentiments.

Serbia and Russia may be more difficult cases, as the national pride of both — for different reasons — has been wounded. While Russia has almost completely lost its superpower status, Serbia was seriously humiliated by NATO in 1999, and many Serbs feel humiliated by ongoing trials of their former leaders at the International Criminal Tribunal at the Hague.

The incentives which the international community, especially of the EU, can offer and which might moderate politics in those two countries are relatively scarce. Moreover, the experiences of average Russians with liberal economic and political reforms after the fall of communism have been rather negative. While most Russians seem to realize their country can no longer be “salvaged” by the Communists, many seem to be betting on semi-authoritarian rule and national revival stemming from traditional Russian values. That, however, has always been a dangerous combination.

Project Syndicate - January 2004