Post-EU Depression

The government of Poland collapsed first, followed by the government of the Czech Republic. Then the Hungarian prime minister resigned. The government of Slovakia lost its majority and is unstable. All of those developments took place not long after the four Central European countries successfully completed their goals of becoming European Union members.

Why should this historic event cause such political calamities? Some argue that perhaps Central Europe’s countries are inherently unstable. Their political cultures are underdeveloped. They were admitted to the EU only fifteen years after communism’s fall, and not all of them had previous experience with democracy. Unlike EU members admitted during earlier enlargements, the Central Europeans suffer from widespread corruption, political nepotism, fragile political parties with unclear identities, and weak civil societies.

All of those problems were to some extent hidden due to the pressure of EU accession. But once the lid of external pressure from Union was lifted after membership was secured, these problems erupted to the surface once more.

There are, however, also concrete causes for Central Europe’s current problems. Above all, all governments that successfully led their countries into the EU had to adopt—often under pressure and hastily—a number of unpopular steps. Although majorities of people in those countries supported Union membership, many citizens thought that their governments paid too high a price.

This was partly caused by the fact that the EU was not as generous toward its newest members as it had been toward new members in the past. Moreover, only fifteen years ago, eight out of the ten new members had state-controlled economies, which meant that a period of painful transition toward a market economy was followed by, or overlapped with, sometimes painful reforms necessary for gaining EU membership.

Even before attaining EU membership, the governments in all candidate countries had to start adopting measures aimed at meeting the Maastricht criteria within several years because the new members had committed themselves in their accession treaties to adopting the euro. Such measures required cutting budget deficits, often at the cost of lowering public expenditures.

In the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the task of completing such difficult reforms just before crossing the “finish line” fell into the hands of socialist parties. They were, as a result, caught between a rock and a hard place. In completing this historic mission, they betrayed their socialist identity in the eyes of leftist voters. In Poland, the Democratic Party of the Left fell apart shortly before accession, the Czech Social Democrats came close to a similar split.

Ruling coalitions were at the same time in disadvantageous positions with regard to opposition parties which claimed that the governments were not able to negotiate good membership conditions, without themselves having to pass the test of negotiating better conditions.

Government parties were also hurt by the nationalistic rhetoric of center/right parties, which repeatedly warned against a betrayal of national interests. The fact that the period of finishing the admission process overlapped with heated discussions about the new European Constitution played into the hands of the opposition. The political right in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic warned against a possible loss of sovereignty should the Constitution be adopted. Such rhetoric played well in former Soviet satellites that had only recently regained their sovereignty.

Despite all this pressure, the ruling coalitions in the Visegrad countries held together, as the historical mission of attaining EU membership worked like a lid in a pressure cooker. Dealing with conflicts among government coalition parties, as well as within individual government parties, was postponed until after the official date of EU entry.

EU membership untied the hands of politicians, and conflicts came to the surface. Polish Prime Minister Lezsek Miller resigned one day after his country’s official admission to the Union. Czech Prime Minister Vladimir Spidla was forced to resign by his own party several weeks later. Hungarian Prime Minister Peter Medgyessy was pushed out not long after that.

Even the right of center Slovak government was not spared. It took it upon itself not only to meet EU membership criteria, but also push forward with other painful reforms. The comfortable role of criticizing the government fell into the hands of leftist populists, for a change. The Slovak government is still in power, but it has lost its majority and could fall soon.

In Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, we will now witness a period of unabashed populism. The ruling coalitions were reconstructed, with new faces at the helm. The main objective of the new prime ministers and cabinet members is to regain popularity for their parties. The ruling coalitions can at long last, at least temporarily, afford “the luxury” of populism that opposition parties used as their main weapon in the last few years. Those who hope for more economic reforms in Central Europe will have to wait.

Project Syndicate - October 2004