One year after the admission of ten new members into the European Union, including the Czech Republic, the Czech view of regional cooperation in the framework of the so-called Visegrad Group is complicated. Not only is there the legacy of skepticism toward regional cooperation on part of some Czech political forces, but the efforts of the current government, which is in favor of regional cooperation, are being made difficult by political developments in other Visegrad countries, in particular Poland.
The Czech Republic’s attitudes toward regional cooperation were always split between political forces that have been strongly in favor of regional cooperation and political forces subscribing to the ideology of Czech exceptionalism. While former dissidents, turned politicians, such as Vaclav Havel were promoting regional ties, conservative politicians, such as Vaclav Klaus, were convinced that closer regional ties would slow down the Czech Republic’s reform efforts. Klaus’s Civic Democrats eventually adopted an instrumental approach to regional cooperation: let’s support regional ties which are good for the Czech Republic. Other political forces, including the presently ruling Social Democrats, have seen the Visegrad group also as a cultural project that is based on a shared legacy.
The Czech Republic’s official attitudes toward regional cooperation differed according to who was in power. From 1992 to 1997, when Klaus was the prime minister, Czech contributions to regional cooperation were symbolic. After the Social Democrats took over as the leading government party in 1998, the Czechs were much more eager to deepen regional ties. However, it is fair to note that between 1992 and 1998 regional cooperation was made problematic not only by the cold attitudes of the Klaus governments in the Czech Republic, but also by the governments of Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia. Between 1998 and 2002 the conservative Hungarian government led by Viktor Orban was the biggest obstacle to more intense regional cooperation.
Regional cooperation intensified after 2002, when political forces favoring regional cooperation gained power in all four Visegrad countries. At the same time, the four countries felt that they needed to coordinate their political activities, as EU membership was coming closer.
Serious problems in regional cooperation emerged at a time when the United States-led coalition of the willing invaded Iraq. While Poland supported the US, other three Visegrad countries were more careful. They tried to balance their cautious support for the US with good relations with Germany and France, which both fiercely opposed the invasion. Poland showed very clearly during this time it intended to act as a European power, and that the views of other Visegrad countries do not necessarily change its policies.
An even bigger rift occurred when Poland, together with Spain, blocked the adoption of the European Constituion at an EU summit. Poland as an EU member was obviously ready to follow its own interests much more than in the past, when coordinating its efforts with other Central European countries was a vehicle for the successful completion of EU accession talks. With EU membership, the coordination of the policies of Poland, whose population is bigger than the combined populations of the other three Visegrad countries, proved to be increasingly difficult.
The four Visegrad countries joined forces again when the European Constituion was rejected by France and the Netherlands, and, in particular, when the EU was unable to approve a new budget. Together with other new members they offered a compromise and pressured big European states to find a solution.
However, regional cooperation was again tested soon afterwards, when the Law and Justice Party won both the parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland. It is clear that the nationalist agenda of this conservative-populist party is difficult to combined with good regional ties. The new Polish government plans to defend much more vigorously than its socialist predecessors “Polish national interests”.
Given the fact that conservative nationalists could win in 2006 in the elections in Hungary and the Czech Republic, and that leftist populists could win in Slovakia, prospects for more intense regional cooperation do not look good at the moment.
The Czech Republic’s attitudes toward regional cooperation will depend on who is in power. Should the Social Democrats prevail in 2006, it is quite possible that in light of the political situation Poland, the Czech Republic will try to shift the focus of its regional policies to the South. Calls by some scholars and politicians have been made to cooperate regionally more with the countries of the former Hapsburg Empire, who are similar in size and shared a common history. Austria has made overtures to other Central European countries in this respect, and some Czech politicians have reacted positively.