Dual Dimensions of Democratic Development
Evaluating the state of liberal democracy in the Czech Republic twenty years after the fall of communism is relative to whether one focuses on institutional or cultural development.
Furthermore, the term liberal democracy itself is rather complex. It attempts to combine two contradicting terms: democracy as a collectivist activity (dependent on the regular manifestation of the will of the majority) and liberalism as an individual activity, emphasizing the role of the individual and freedom.
In a liberal democracy a certain tension exists between democracy as the rule of the people and liberalism as the rule of the law. Liberal democracy is therefore sometimes referred to as liberal constitutionalism or constitutional democracy.
Understanding Liberal Democracy
Considering the complexity of the term liberal democracy, it is not surprising that the first generation of Czech politicians and citizens after 1989 adopted a simplified version of democracy. It was predominantly understood as free competition between political parties, which would occasionally compete for power in elections. The citizens would express their will in elections, and the victorious political parties would receive the opportunity to govern the state for a few years. Democracy was thereby reduced to a jousting ring of associated interests.
In understanding Czech liberal democracy, the term “democracy” has dominated the term “liberal” for quite some time. In this partnership, “liberalism” emphasizes the rules of the game, such as protecting the rights of the individual. In advanced liberal democracies, the rules of the game include constitutionalism (as represented by a respected and not easily amended constitution), but also the protection of human and minority rights, as well as respect for the independent institutions of political majorities empowered by fair democratic elections.
One might further nuance the definition of liberal democracy (beyond the rule of the people by the people) by defining it as the rule of the law of the people. This definition emphasizes civic equality as a basic and defining principle of liberal democracy. And thus, while free competition creates social and economic discrepancies, all citizens remain equal in the eyes of the law. Competing opinions may therefore thrive free from the monopoly of any one idea.
The competition of opinions requires not only certain cultural and political presumptions (known as the democratic spirit, i.e., tolerance and respect of others), but it also requires that certain civic virtues are present in society.
In other words, liberal democracy will only function fully if it is enthused with certain values. Good laws and sensible rules of the game are not enough if society neither respects nor abides by them. Members of society may attain these virtues through a common ethical background or through the gradual internalization of certain rules.
Fast Institutional Modernization versus Frame of Mind
Czech society has not yet grasped all these rather obscure conditions for liberal democracy. The fact that the institutional aspect of liberal democracy developed faster than changes in the mentalité has left the cultural conditions for democracy lagging behind, complicating matters further.
The massive transfer of know-how from the EU and other international institutions supporting democratisation to transform politics, economics, and the law, also paradoxically, created uneven development in the Czech Republic and other post-communist states. The speed with which institutional modernization set post-Soviet states on a path towards democracy as well as “to Europe” was historically unprecedented.
In this way, a more or less functioning institutional framework for liberal democracy was created: starting with the necessary constitutional and legal conditions for a functioning democratic system, ending with protection of human rights. Society’s internalization of the necessary democratic-liberal values has, however, taken a lot longer to take root.
There are many reasons for this. Mainly, this process is dependent on the quality and strength of civic society – the environment through which citizens develop civic virtues. Civic society does not form from “above” like other constitutional, political, or economic institutions, but rather from “below;” and while it requires human initiative, growth occurs at its own pace. Good laws may hasten this process, but they cannot create civic society.
Accepting liberal democracy as a certain set of behaviors and frame of mind is also a generational process. Tomáš G. Masaryk was markedly clairvoyant when he described the newly established Czechoslovakia as a democracy without democrats, and posited that two generations (40 to 50 years) would lapse before a real democracy would emerge.
Even today, twenty years after the fall of communism, we are still to a certain extent living in a democracy without democrats. Arguably, several years will pass before our rather miserable “democratic culture” catches up with the speedy and relatively successful institutional modernization.
The discrepancy between democratic institutional development and that of a democratic culture is readily apparent. The absence of a democratic culture is evident in low levels of social participation and in even lower levels of public discussion, which still functions as a sort of caricature of perpetual class struggle. The situation is no better within the government; Czech politicians are known for their attempts to restrain independent institutions such as the justice department, the central bank, and the media.
Further Complications
Liberal democracy’s roots in the Czech Republic began in the context of revolutionary global changes fueled predominantly by globalisation, which itself was largely fueled by revolutionary changes in communication technologies and science.
Though the nation-state gave birth to the concept of liberal democracy, the idea itself has come under increasing pressure in this globalised world. Liberal democracy’s viability at the supra-national integration level remains unclear. For example, the European Union’s present state reveals that is it easier to apply constitutional liberalism (the rule of law and protection of human rights) to the supra-national level than the procedural dimension of democracy. The development of “cultural” conditions for democracy, such as one political nation on a European scale, lags behind.
Globalisation has also damaged other traditional dimensions of liberal democracy. Political parties are decreasing in significance all around the world, and fewer people are exercising their right to vote in elections. Meanwhile, the influence of expert bureaucracies is on the rise.
The relationship between media and politics has also become more complicated. Modern media, especially television, are now major players on the political scene. With political agendas of their own, the media pretends to be the voice of the people; in reality, it is merely a tool of private interests.
In traditional liberal democracies, the social dimension of democratic thought and action is a condition for the existence of civically-minded individuals – in the Czech Republic, however, civic society is disappearing as (often non-transparent) private interest groups colonize it. These interest groups have increasingly become the products of both globalisation and a national political landscape that is spiraling out of control.
To a certain extent, the paradigm of liberal democracy is thus changing. For example, civic society, which should serve as a counterweight to political power and also foster an environment for the creation of civic virtues, is “virtualising” under the influence of new technologies; public discourse and action have begun to increasingly occur through technologies such as Facebook.
What impact this development will have on liberal democracy is not yet clear. It is, however, apparent that in light of these new technologies, which enable a large number of individuals to communicate instantly and directly with each other, the role of representative democracy based on political parties is diminishing.
Thus, as Czech liberal democracy develops into something comparable with other developed democracies, the changes that still need to take place in the “non-institutional” (cultural) dimension will take place in a world of revolutionary changes, some of which may actually alter the paradigm of liberal democracy.
The New Presence, Summer 2009
